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1 Introduction
Both in the theory of economic growth and in the practical evaluation of economic
policy with long-term effects (e.g., climate policies), it is common to apply the
discounted utilitarian (DU ) criterion. DU means that one infinite stream of con-
sumption is deemed better than another if and only if it generates a higher sum of
utilities discounted by a constant per period discount factor δ, where δ is positive
and smaller than one.
In spite of its prevalence, DU is controversial, both due to the conditions through
which it is justified and due to its consequences for choice in economically relevant
situations. As a matter of principle, DU gives less weight to the utility of future
generations and therefore treats generations in an unequal manner. If one abstracts
from the probability that the world will be coming to an end, thereby assuming that
any generation will appear with certainty, it is natural to question whether it is fair
to value the utility of future generations less than that of the present one. This
criticism has a long tradition in economics, dating back at least to Pigou (1932).
When applied to some models of economic growth, DU leads to seemingly un-
appealing consequences. In particular, in the model of capital accumulation and
resource depletion first analyzed by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Solow (1974) —
which we will henceforth refer to as the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow (DHS ) model — the
application of DU forces consumption to approach zero as time goes to infinity, even
though sustainable streams with constant or increasing consumption are feasible.
Moreover, this result holds for any discount factor δ smaller than one; even when
δ is close to one so that discounting is small. In other words, when applied to the
DHS model, the use of DU undermines the livelihood of generations in the far future
also when each generation is given almost the same weight as its predecessor.
This motivates the central question posed in this paper: Does there exist an
alternative criterion of intergenerational justice satisfying the following desiderata:
(1) The criterion incorporates an equity condition respecting the interests of future
generations.
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(2) The criterion resolves intergenerational conflicts by leading to consequences
with ethical appeal, in particular when applied to the DHS model, as well as
to the usual one-sector model of economic growth (the Ramsey model).
In our investigation, we adopt a setting that allows for easy comparison with DU,
as axiomatized by Koopmans (1960). In particular, we remain within Koopmans’
(1960) framework, by requiring our criterion (a) to be representable by a numerical
social welfare function (SWF), (b) to satisfy Koopmans’ (1960) stationarity condi-
tion, and (c) to retain some sensitivity to the interest of the present generation.
One way of ensuring that generations are treated in an equal manner is to insist
on the procedural equity condition of Finite Anonymity. Finite Anonymity means
that a finite permutation of a consumption stream leads to an alternative stream that
is equally good in social evaluation. Finite Anonymity has the interesting property
that — when combined with the Pareto principle in models of economic growth — it
rules out streams that are not non-decreasing, provided that the technology satisfies
a productivity condition (see Asheim, Buchholz and Tungodden, 2001). Since a DHS
technology is productive in this sense, Finite Anonymity combined with the Pareto
principle entails that only efficient and non-decreasing streams are acceptable. In
particular, it thus formalizes the ethical intuition that deems as unacceptable the
consequences of discounted utilitarianism in the setting of DHS technologies.
However, as demonstrated by Basu and Mitra (2003), there exists no numerically
representable welfare function which satisfies both Finite Anonymity and the Pareto
principle in the setting of infinite streams. This is illustrated by classical utilitarian-
ism and leximin (adapted to this setting), which satisfy Finite Anonymity and the
Pareto principle but are not numerically representable. In fact, Finite Anonymity
is hard to combine with any kind of sensitivity to the interests of each generation,
as long as one requires numerical representability (see Basu and Mitra, 2007).
An alternative is to apply the axiom of Hammond Equity for the Future (HEF ),
which is a weak consequentialist equity condition introduced by Asheim and Tungod-
den (2004) and analyzed by Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2007, 2009), Banerjee
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(2006) and Alcantud and Garc´ıa-Sanz (2008). HEF captures the following ethical
intuition: a sacrifice by the present generation leading to a uniform gain for all fu-
ture generations cannot yield a consumption stream that is less desirable in social
evaluation if the present remains better off than the future even after the sacrifice.
Under consistency requirements on the social preferences, HEF is not only weaker
than the ordinary Hammond Equity condition, but it is also implied by other con-
sequentialist equity conditions like the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers and the
Lorenz Domination principle (see Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden, 2007, for details).
Hence, it can be endorsed both from an egalitarian and a utilitarian point of view.
Combined with continuity, HEF entails that social evaluation is sensitive to the
interests of the present generation only when the present is worse off than the future.
As investigated in our companion paper, Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2009), the
axiom can be introduced in the Koopmans framework, in which it can be used to
justify what we there refer to as a sustainable recursive SWF. A sustainable recursive
SWF has a continuous and non-decreasing aggregator function over present utility
and future welfare, which is increasing in future welfare and exhibits sensitivity for
present utility if and only if present utility falls short of future welfare. It is shown
in our companion paper that any such SWF satisfies the main Chichilnisky (1996)
axioms: No dictatorship of the present and No dictatorship of the future.
The purpose of the current paper is to apply the concept of sustainable recur-
sive SWFs to two important classes of technologies used to model economic growth:
Ramsey technologies and DHS technologies. We thereby demonstrate the applica-
bility of this concept and allow judgements to be made on its consequences in these
models. For reasons of tractability, we consider a sub-class of sustainable recursive
SWFs, which we refer to as sustainable discounted utilitarian (SDU) preferences,
obtained by considering a modification of DU preferences consistent with the condi-
tion of HEF. The resulting criterion, which we refer to as the SDU criterion, allows
for easy comparison with the DU criterion.
SDU avoids the pitfalls of DU (which is too willing to sacrifice future genera-
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tions), of classical utilitarianism (which is too willing to sacrifice the present gen-
eration), and of leximin (which is too willing to ignore possibilities for immense
and infinitely lasting future benefits for future generations at a bearable cost to the
present generation).
In suggesting an alternative that differs from the three criteria of DU, classical
utilitarianism and leximin, SDU follows the lead of Chichilnisky’s (1996) sustainable
preference. However, applied to Ramsey and DHS technologies there exists no opti-
mum under a sustainable preference defined as the sum of a discounted utilitarian
part and an asymptotic part (which is an integral with respect to a purely finitely
additive measure, cf. Chichilnisky, 1996, Theorems 1 and 2), unless time-variant
discounting is used and the discounted utilitarian optimization leads to unbounded
consumption growth, making the asymptotic part redundant (cf. Heal, 1998). It is
therefore of particular interest to establish that SDU, being an SWF that satisfies
the two main Chichilnisky (1996) axioms, is not subject to any similar existence
problem in these technological environments.
We now briefly describe the contents of the paper. In Section 2 we present the
formal definition of an SDU SWF: an SWF is SDU if it satisfies four requirements.
While three of these requirements are also satisfied by DU, one departs from DU by
requiring that an SDU SWF not be sensitive to the interests of the present generation
if the present is better off than the future. This requirement ensures that an SDU
SWF satisfies HEF. We present in this section the important result (Theorem 1)
that an SDU SWF always exists, and that it is unique when restricted to the subset
of bounded streams. Moreover, we observe (Proposition 1) that any SDU SWF is a
sustainable recursive SWF.
In Section 3 we provide a convenient sufficient condition to identify SDU opti-
mum streams within any given set of feasible streams (Proposition 3). In Section 4
we consider the class of Ramsey technologies and characterize the set of SDU op-
timum streams in this environment (Theorem 2). Likewise, in Section 5 we apply
results from earlier work (Dasgupta and Mitra, 1983; Asheim, 1988) and characterize
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the set of SDU optimum streams in the class of DHS technologies (Theorem 3).
In Section 6 we discuss how SDU resolves distributional conflicts between gen-
erations; in particular, in DHS technologies the use of SDU leads to development
at first when capital is productive, while protecting the generations in the distant
future from the grave consequences of discounting when the vanishing resource stock
undermines capital productivity.
The technical parts of the paper, including proofs of all the lemmas, are presented
in an appendix. It is useful for the reader to note that the lemmas whose statements
appear in the main text (in Sections 4 and 5) are numbered as Lemmas 1–6, and
their proofs are included in Appendix A.5. Lemmas whose statements appear only
in the Appendix are preliminary results used to prove the theorems and propositions
in the main text and are numbered Lemmas A.1–A.3.
2 Sustainable discounted utilitarian SWFs
Denote by R+ the set of all non-negative real numbers, by R++ the set of all positive
real numbers, by Z+ the set of all non-negative integers, and by N the set of all
positive integers. Denote by 0x = (x0, x1, . . . , xt, . . . ) ∈ RZ++ an infinite stream of
consumption where, for t ∈ Z+, xt is a non-negative indicator of the well-being of
generation t. Define, for T ∈ N, 0xT−1 = (x0, . . . , xT−1) and Tx = (xT , xT+1, . . . );
these are, respectively, the T -head and the T -tail of 0x. A consumption stream 0x
is called egalitarian if xt = xt+1 for all t ∈ Z+.
Utility in a period is derived from consumption in that period alone. The utility
function U : R+ → R is assumed to satisfy:
U is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuous on R+ (U.1)
U is continuously differentiable on R++, and U ′(x)→∞ as x→ 0 . (U.2)
Denote by δ ∈ (0, 1) the utility discount factor. Consider the following classes of
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infinite consumption streams:
Xδ :=
{
0x ∈ RZ++ |
∑∞
t=0
δtxt <∞
}
Xϕ :=
{
0x ∈ RZ++ | 0x is bounded
}
.
Note that, if 0 < δ′ < δ′′ < 1, then Xδ′ ) Xδ′′ )
⋂
δ∈(0,1)Xδ ) Xϕ.
Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), the SWF w : Xδ → R defined by
w(0x) := (1− δ)
∑∞
t=0
δtU(xt)
is the discounted utilitarian (DU) SWF. It follows from (U.1) that w is well-defined.
Multiplying the sum of discounted utilities by 1 − δ ensures that w(0x) = U(x0) if
0x is egalitarian.
The sustainable discounted utilitarian (SDU) SWF modifies DU in the following
manner. Given any δ ∈ (0, 1), an SWF W : Xδ → R is SDU if
W (0x) =

(1− δ)U(x0) + δW (1x) if U(x0) ≤W (1x)
W (1x) if U(x0) > W (1x) ,
(W.1)
W (0x) = U(x0) if 0x is egalitarian , (W.2)
W (0x′) ≥ W (0x′′) if 0x′ ≥ 0x′′ , (W.3)
limT→∞δTW (Tx) = 0 . (W.4)
Requirement (W.1) departs from DU by requiring that an SDU SWF not be sensitive
to the interests of the present generation if the present is better off than the future.
In constrast, the other three requirements defining an SDU SWF, (W.2)–(W.4), are
also satisfied by DU. They are restrictions which are independent of (W.1).
We now state and prove a result which addresses the issues of existence and
uniqueness of a SDU SWF.
Theorem 1 Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and U : R+ → R satisfying (U.1) be given. Then:
(i) There exists an SWF, W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)-(W.4);
6
(ii) If W : Xδ → R is any SDU SWF, then W (0x) =W (0x) for all 0x ∈ Xϕ;
(iii) If W : Xδ → R is any SDU SWF, then W (0x) ≤W (0x) for all 0x ∈ Xδ.
Proof. To establish (i), consider the following algorithmic construction. For
any stream 0x ∈ Xδ and each T ∈ N, construct the finite sequence:
z(T, T ) = w(Tx)
z(T − 1, T ) = min{(1− δ)U(xT−1) + δz(T, T ), z(T, T )}
· · ·
z(0, T ) = min{(1− δ)U(x0) + δz(1, T ), z(1, T )} .

(1)
Define the mapping W : Xδ → R by
W (0x) := limT→∞z(0, T ) . (W)
Then, it can be shown that W is well defined by (W) and satisfies (W.1)–(W.4).
The details of this demonstration are presented in Appendix A.1.
Part (ii) can be demonstrated by using (W.1)–(W.4), (1) and (W), by studying
the asymptotic behavior of any SDU SWF. This is shown in detail in Appendix A.2.
Part (iii) can be established by comparing the asymptotic behaviors of any SDU
SWF with a DU SWF. This is demonstrated in detail in Appendix A.3.
Remark 1 Note that the particular algorithmic construction described in (1) has
significance beyond the existence result described in part (i) of Theorem 1, in view of
the result described in part (iii). That is, W yields an upper bound on SDU welfare
for all consumption streams. Further, it is worth observing that there does exist a
class of consumption streams Xδ, and an SDU SWF W on Xδ such that W (0x) <
W (0x) for some 0x ∈ Xδ. A concrete example demonstrating this non-uniqueness
result is presented in Appendix A.3. In contrast, when the class of consumption
streams is bounded, this possibility is ruled out, as noted in the uniqueness result
of part (ii) of Theorem 1.
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Any SDU SWF is a sustainable recursive SWF, as defined by Asheim, Mitra and
Tungodden (2009), who provide an axiomatization of this class of SWFs. We record
this observation (which is verified in Appendix A.4) formally as follows.
Proposition 1 Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and U : R+ → R satisfying (U.1) be given. Then any
SWF, W : Xδ → R, satisfying (W.1)–(W.4), is a sustainable recursive SWF.
The following result provides a basic relationship between SDU and DU SWFs.
Proposition 2 Assume that W is an SDU SWF.
(i) If 0x ∈ Xδ, then, for all t ≥ 0, W (0x) ≤W (tx) ≤ w(tx)
(ii) If 0x ∈ Xδ is a non-decreasing stream, then W (0x) = w(0x).
Proof. Part (i). It follows from (W.1) that for all t ≥ 0,
W (tx) = min{(1− δ)U(xt) + δW (t+1x), W (t+1x)} ≤ W (t+1x) .
Hence, W (0x) ≤W (tx).
Using (W.1), we have for all t ≥ 0,
W (tx) = min{(1− δ)U(xt) + δW (t+1x), W (t+1x)} ≤ (1− δ)U(xt) + δW (t+1x) .
Thus, by using (W.4), we obtain for all t ≥ 0,
W (tx) ≤ (1− δ)
∑∞
s=t
δs−tU(xs) ≡ w(tx) .
Part (ii). Given any t ≥ 0, we have:
W (t+1x) =W (xt+1, xt+2, .....)
≥W (xt, xt, ......) by (W.3) since tx is non-decreasing
= U(xt) by (W.2).
Using this in (W.1), we have for all t ≥ 0,
W (tx) = (1− δ)U(xt) + δW (t+1x)
so that:
W (0x) = (1− δ)
∑∞
t=0
δtU(xt)
by using (W.4). Thus, W (0x) = w(0x).
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3 Sustainable discounted utilitarian optimum
We now introduce the notions of feasibility and optimum in our study. Let X ⊂ Xδ
denote the set of feasible consumption streams; it will be assumed to be non-empty
and convex. This set will be determined by the technology available over time
to transform inputs into outputs, and on the initial stocks of the various inputs
available to an economy. In the next two sections, we will see how the set of feasible
consumption streams is obtained, starting with the more primitive information of
technology and available resources.
Given a discount factor δ and utility function U satisfying (U.1) and (U.2), a
consumption stream 0x¯ ∈ X will be called SDU optimum if, for some W : Xδ → R
satisfying (W.1)–(W.4):
W (0x) ≤W (0x¯) for all 0x ∈ X .
This definition entails that 0x¯ ∈ X is a unique SDU optimum if and only if, for every
W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4):
W (0x) < W (0x¯) for all 0x ∈ X , 0x 6= 0x¯ .
Similarly, a consumption stream 0x′ ∈ X will be called DU optimum if:
w(0x) ≤ w(0x′) for all 0x ∈ X .
We now provide a convenient sufficient condition for an egalitarian consumption
stream to be the unique SDU optimum.
Proposition 3 Let 0xe  0 be an egalitarian consumption stream in X. Assume
that there exists a price sequence 0p = (p0, p1, p2, . . . ) 0 satisfying
pt+1/pt ≥ δ for t ≥ 0 , (2)
∞ >
∑∞
t=0
ptx
e
t ≥
∑∞
t=0
ptxt (3)
for every consumption stream 0x ∈ X. Then 0xe is the unique SDU optimum.
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Proof. Suppose that 0x is a feasible consumption stream, distinct from 0xe,
with W (0x) ≥ W (0xe) for some W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4). Then, by
(W.3) and Proposition 2,
w(txe) = w(0xe) = U(xe0) =W (0x
e) ≤W (0x) ≤W (tx) ≤ w(tx) . (4)
For t ≥ 0, write
At :=
∑∞
τ=t
δτ (xτ − xeτ ) , (5)
where the infinite sum in (5) is absolutely convergent and therefore convergent, given
that 0x ∈ X ⊆ Xδ. Thus, At ∈ R for t ≥ 0.
Using (U.1)–(U.2) and the fact that 0xe  0 is egalitarian, we have for τ ≥ 0,
U(xτ )− U(xeτ ) ≤ U ′(xeτ )(xτ − xeτ ) = U ′(xe0)(xτ − xeτ ) , (6)
with strict inequality in (6) if xτ 6= xeτ . Also, for t ≥ 0,
w(tx)− w(txe) = 1− δ
δt
·
∑∞
τ=t
δτ
(
U(xτ )− U(xeτ )
)
. (7)
Combining (5), (6) and (7), we have
w(tx)− w(txe) ≤ 1− δ
δt
· U ′(xe0)At (8)
for t ≥ 0, with strict inequality in (8) for t = 0. Combining (4) and (5), we have
A0 > 0 and At ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 1 . (9)
For t ≥ 0, write
at := δt(xt − xet ) , bt :=
pt
δt
. (10)
Note that, by (4) and (10), At −At+1 = at for all t ≥ 0, and, by (2),
bt+1 − bt = pt+1
δt+1
− pt
δt
=
pt
δt+1
·
(
pt+1
pt
− δ
)
≥ 0 (11)
for all t ≥ 0. Then, for all T ≥ 0, we have (using Abel’s partial summation method)∑T
t=0
atbt = (A0 −A1)b0 + · · · + (AT −AT+1)bT
= A0b0 + A1(b1 − b0) + · · · + AT (bT − bT−1) − AT+1bT
≥ A0b0 − AT+1bT ,
(12)
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where the inequality in (12) follows from (9) and (11). For T ≥ 0, we get
AT+1bT =
(∑∞
τ=T+1
δτ (xτ − xeτ )
)
· pT
δT
= δpT ·
[(∑∞
τ=T+1
δτ−(T+1)xτ
)
− x
e
T+1
1− δ
]
<
∑∞
τ=T+1
pτxτ
(13)
since xeτ = x
e
T+1 > 0 and pτ/pT ≥ δτ−T for all τ > T . By (3), limT→∞
∑∞
τ=T+1pτxτ
= 0. Using this fact in (13), we obtain
limT→∞AT+1bT = 0 . (14)
It follows from (9) and (14) that, for any ε ∈ (0, A0b0), there exists T˜ such that, for
all T ≥ T˜ , AT+1bT ≤ A0b0 − ε. Hence, by (10) and (12), for all T ≥ T˜ ,∑T
t=0
pt(xt − xet ) =
∑T
t=0
atbt ≥ A0b0 −AT+1bT ≥ ε > 0 .
This contradicts (3) and shows that there is no feasible stream 0x, distinct from 0xe,
with W (0x) ≥W (0xe).
4 Ramsey technologies
A Ramsey technology (following Ramsey, 1928) is determined by a sequence of pro-
duction functions 0g = (g0, g1, g2, . . . ) where, for each t, gt : R+ → R+ satisfies
gt is concave, continuous and increasing on R+ , (g.1)
gt is continuously differentiable on R++ , (g.2)
gt(0) = 0 , g′t > 0 on R++ . (g.3)
For each t, the gross output function ft is defined by ft(k) = gt(k) + k for all k ≥ 0.
Let y denote gross output, which is split into consumption x and capital input k.
A program (ty, tk) is yt–feasible if there exist tk and t+1y satisfying
0 ≤ kτ ≤ yτ and 0 ≤ yτ+1 ≤ fτ (kτ ) for all τ ≥ t .
The consumption tx associated with a yt–feasible program (ty, tk) is defined by
xτ = yτ − kτ for all τ ≥ t. A yt–feasible program (ty, tk) is called egalitarian if
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the consumption stream tx associated with it is egalitarian. A yt–feasible program
(ty¯, tk¯) is yt-efficient if there is no yt–feasible program (ty, tk) satisfying xτ ≥ x¯τ
for all τ ≥ t, with strict inequality for some τ ≥ t.
The set X ⊂ RZ++ of feasible consumption streams, introduced in the previous
section, can be described for Ramsey technologies by:
X = {0x ∈ RZ++ | 0x is a consumption stream associated
with a y0–feasible program (0y, 0k)} .
Combined with the results of Cass and Yaari (1971), Proposition 3 implies the
following sufficient condition for a unique SDU optimum.
Proposition 4 Consider a Ramsey technology satisfying (g.1)–(g.3) and X ⊆ Xδ.
Assume that the y0–feasible program (0ye, 0ke) is egalitarian and y0–efficient with
(0ye, 0ke) 0, and satisfies:
δf ′t(k
e
t ) ≤ 1 for t ≥ 0 , (15)
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
[
1∏t
τ=0f
′
τ (keτ )
]
<∞ . (16)
Then (0ye, 0ke) is the unique SDU optimum.
Proof. Since 0ke  0, the price sequence 0p 0 determined by
p0 = 1 and pt+1f ′t(k
e
t ) = pt for all t ≥ 0 (17)
is well-defined. Then (15) implies that (2) is satisfied and (16) implies that
∑∞
t=0ptx
e
t
<∞, and so (3) follows from the Corollary of Cass and Yaari (1971, p. 338). Hence,
Proposition 4 follows from Proposition 3.
We illustrate the usefulness of Proposition 4 by considering the special case of a
linear technology where, for each t, gt(k) = rtk with rt > 0, so that ft(k) = (rt+1)k.
In this case, the price sequence 0p defined by (17) is independent of the program, as
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for any (0y, 0k), pt+1(rt + 1) = pt for all t ≥ 0. Furthermore, the set of yt-feasible
consumption streams at time t is given by {tx |
∑∞
τ=t pτxτ ≤ ptyt}. Assume that
∞∑
t=0
pt = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
[
1∏t
τ=0(rτ + 1)
]
<∞ ; (18)
rt ≥  > 0 for all t ≥ 0 is sufficient for this. Moreover, assume also that
δp0/p1 < 1 , (p.1)
δp1
/(
(1− δ)
∑∞
t=2
pt
)
> 1 , (p.2)
δpt/pt+1 ≤ 1 for t ≥ 2 , (p.3)
implying that the economy is particularly productive in period 1.
By combining (p.3) and (18) with Proposition 4, it follows that, for given y2 > 0,
the unique SDU optimum consumption stream at t = 2, 2x∗, satisfies x∗t = x¯2(y2) =
p2y2/(
∑∞
τ=2 pτ ) for all t ≥ 2. By (U.1), the value function V2(y2) ≡ U(x¯2(y2)) =
W (2x∗) is strictly concave and continuously differentiable with
V ′2(y2) =
(
p2
/∑∞
t=2
pt
)
U ′(x¯2(y2)) > 0 .
To determine, for given y1 > 0, the unique SDU optimum consumption stream at
t = 1, 1x∗, note first that y2 = p1(y1−x1)/p2, and that there is a unique consumption
at time 1, x1 = x¯1(y1) = p1y1/(
∑∞
τ=1 pτ ) > 0, satisfying U(x1) = V2(p1(y1−x1)/p2).
For given y1 > 0, consider the problem of maximizing w.r.t. x1
pi1(x1) ≡ (1− δ)U(x1) + δV2(p1(y1 − x1)/p2) (19)
subject to x1 ≤ x¯1(y1). By (U.1)–(U.2) and (p.2), pi′1(x1) is continuous and decreas-
ing with pi′1(x1) > 0 for all x1 close to 0 and pi′1(x1) < 0 for x1 = x¯1(y1). So there
is a unique x∗1 ∈ (0, x¯1(y1)) such that pi′1(x∗1) = 0. Since pi1 is strictly concave, x∗1
uniquely solves maximization problem (19).
It follows from (W.1) that x1(y1) = x∗1 ∈ (0, x¯1(y1)) is the SDU optimum con-
sumption at t = 1 as a function of y1, with x1(y1) satisfying the first-order condition
(1− δ)U ′(x1(y1)) = δ p1∑∞
τ=2 pτ
U ′(x¯2(p1(y1 − x1(y1)))) . (20)
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By (U.1), the value function V1(y1) ≡ pi1(x1(y1)) is strictly concave and, by Ben-
veniste and Scheinkman (1979, Lemma 1), continuously differentiable with
V ′1(y1) = (1− δ)U ′(x1(y1)) > 0 .
Note that x∗1 = x1(y1) < x¯1(y1) < x¯2(p1(y1 − x1(y1))/p2) = x∗t for all t ≥ 2.
To determine, for given y0 > 0, the unique SDU optimum consumption stream at
t = 0, 0x∗, note first that y1 = p0(y0−x0)/p1, and that there is a unique consumption
at time 0, x0 = x¯0(y0) > 0, satisfying U(x0) = V1(p0(y0 − x0)/p1).
For given y0 > 0, consider the problem of maximizing w.r.t. x0
pi0(x0) ≡ (1− δ)U(x0) + δV1(p0(y0 − x0)/p1) (21)
subject to x0 ≤ x¯0(y0). By (U.1)–(U.2), pi′0(x0) is continuous and decreasing with
pi′0(x1) > 0 for all x0 close to 0. So there is a unique x∗0 ∈ (0, x¯0(y0)] such that
pi′0(x
∗
0) ≥ 0 and pi′0(x∗0)[x∗0 − x¯0(y0)] = 0 .
Since pi0 is strictly concave, x∗0 uniquely solves maximization problem (21).
It follows from (W.1) that x0(y0) = x∗0 ∈ (0, x¯0(y0)] is the SDU optimum con-
sumption at t = 0 as a function of y0. Either (i) x0(y0) = x¯0(y0) or (ii) x0(y0) <
x¯0(y0), in which case x0(y0) satisfies the first-order condition
U ′(x0(y0)) = δ
p0
p1
U ′(x1(p0(y0 − x0)/p1)) . (22)
The definition of x¯0(y0) implies that x∗1 < x∗0 < x∗t for all t ≥ 2 in case (i), while this
follows from (p.1) and the strict concavity of U in case (ii).
This example gives rise to two remarks. First, even though it follows from
Proposition 2 that SDU welfare is non-decreasing: W (tx) ≤ W (t+1x) for all t ≥ 0,
it is not the case that an SDU optimum consumption stream must be non-decreasing.
Indeed, x0 may contribute to W (0x) even if x0 > x1, provided that U(x1) < W (2x).
The above example with a non-stationary technology illustrates this possibility.
Second, the example illustrates that SDU does not satisfy Finite Anonymity.
Since r0 > 0, so that 1 = p0 > p1, it is feasible to permute the consumption levels
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of generations 0 and 1. However, this leads to strictly lower SDU welfare. Due to
utility discounting, generation 1 makes a larger sacrifice than generation 0 for the
purpose of accumulating capital to benefit later generations (cf. (22)). On the other
hand, utility discounting also reduces the sacrifice that should optimally be made
(cf. (20)), thereby protecting generation 1 from an excessively high savings rate.
We now specialize our discussion to the case in which the production functions for
the various time periods are the same, and the net capital productivity approaches
zero as the capital stock approaches infinity. This is expressed formally in
gt = g for all t ≥ 0 , (g.4)
limk→∞g′(k) = 0 . (g.5)
Write the gross output function as f(k) = g(k) + k.
It follows from (g.1)–(g.5) that, for every y > 0, there exists a unique x(y),
satisfying 0 < x(y) < y, which solves y = f(y − x(y)); define x(0) = 0. For each
y, x(y) represents the consumption level which keeps the output level y intact over
time. Clearly, x : R+ → R+ is continuous for x ≥ 0, and differentiable with
x′(y) =
f ′(y − x(y))− 1
f ′(y − x(y)) > 0 .
For all y > 0, write
δ(y) :=
1
f ′(y − x(y)) .
Then δ : R++ → (0, 1) is continuous and non-decreasing in y with limy→∞δ(y) = 1
by (g.5). Define δ(0) := limy↓0δ(y).
Finally, we can define y∞(δ), for all δ ∈ (0, 1), by
y∞(δ) := min{y ≥ 0 | δ(y) ≥ δ} .
Then y∞ : (0, 1)→ R+ is strictly increasing on [δ(0), 1].
Theorem 2 Consider a Ramsey technology satisfying (g.1)–(g.5). For any δ ∈
(0, 1) and y0 > 0, there exists a unique SDU optimum 0x∗.
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(i) If y0 ≥ y∞(δ), then 0x∗ is efficient and egalitarian with x∗t = x(y0) for all
t ≥ 0.
(ii) If y0 < y∞(δ), then 0x∗ is efficient and strictly increasing, maximizing w(0x)
over all y0-feasible consumption streams and converging to x(y∞(δ)).
For the proof of Theorem 2 we use the result that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), the set
of y0–feasible consumption streams, X, is included in Xδ. This result is stated in
Lemma 1 below, and proved in Appendix A.5.
Lemma 1 Let y0 > 0 be given. For all δ ∈ (0, 1), X ⊆ Xδ.
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix δ ∈ (0, 1) and y0 > 0.
Case (i): y0 ≥ y∞(δ). By the definition of y∞(δ) it follows that δ(y0) ≥ δ.
Consider the y0–feasible stream 0x∗ defined by x∗t = x(y0) for all t ≥ 0, with
associated y0–feasible program (0ye, 0ke) satisfying, for all t ≥ 0, yet = y0 and
ket = y0 − x(y0). Then, (0ye, 0ke) is clearly egalitarian.
Since y0 > 0, we have f(y0 − x(y0)) = y0 > 0, and so (y0 − x(y0)) > 0. Thus,
θ := g′((y0 − x(y0)) is well-defined and positive. Hence,
f ′(ket ) = f
′(y0 − x(y0)) = 1 + θ > 1
for all t, so that (16) is satisfied. Further, the price sequence 0p  0 determined
by (17), is well-defined, and limt→∞ ptket = 0. Thus, by the Theorem of Cass and
Yaari (1971, p. 337), (0ye, 0ke) is efficient. By the definition of the function δ,
f ′(ket ) = f
′(y0 − x(y0)) = 1
δ(y0)
≤ 1
δ
for all t, so that (15) is also satisfied. It follows now from Proposition 4 and Lemma
1 that 0x∗ is the unique SDU optimum.
Case (ii): y0 < y∞(δ). By the definition of y∞(δ) it follows that δ(y0) < δ. It is
well-known (see Beals and Koopmans, 1969) that there exists y0–feasible program
(0y∗, 0k∗) satisfying
limt→∞y∗t = y∞(δ) and limt→∞k
∗
t = y∞(δ)− x(y∞(δ)) ,
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which is efficient, and which has associated with it a y0–feasible stream 0x∗ ∈ Xϕ.
Furthermore, 0x∗ is strictly increasing and uniquely maximizes w(0x) over all y0–
feasible programs (0y, 0k) with associated y0–feasible stream 0x. Hence, if 0x is a
y0–feasible stream distinct from 0x∗ and W : Xδ → R satisfies (W.1)–(W.4), then
Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 imply
W (0x∗) = w(0x∗) > w(0x) ≥ W (0x) ,
thereby establishing that 0x∗ is the unique SDU optimum.
Theorem 2 means that the unique SDU optimum stream coincides the DU op-
timum stream with increasing consumption if there is a small initial capital stock
(so that net capital productivity is high), while it coincides with the egalitarian and
efficient stream with a large initial capital stock.
5 Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technologies
A Dasgupta-Heal-Solow technology (DHS) (see Dasgupta and Heal, 1974, 1979;
Solow, 1974) is determined by a stationary production function G : R3+ → R that
satisfies
G is concave, non-decreasing, homogeneous of
degree one, and continuous for (k, r, `) ∈ R3+ ,
(G.1)
G is twice continuously differentiable
and satisfies (Gk, Gr, G`) 0 for (k, r, `) ∈ R3++ .
(G.2)
G(k, 0, `) = 0 = G(0, r, `) (G.3)
Given any (k′, r′) 0, there is η′ > 0 such that for all (k, r)
satisfying k ≥ k′, 0 < r ≤ r′, [rGr(k, r, 1)]/G`(k, r, 1) ≥ η′ .
(G.4)
(G.3) states that both capital input k and resource use r are essential in production.
(G.4) requires that the ratio of the share of the resource in net output to the share
of labor in net output is bounded away from zero (when labor is fixed at unit level).
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The labor force is assumed to be stationary and normalized to 1. The gross
output function F , is defined by F (k, r) = G(k, r, 1) + k for all (k, r) ≥ 0, and is
assumed to satisfy
F is strictly concave in (k, r) on R2+ (F.1)
Fkr ≥ 0 for (k, r) ∈ R2++ , (F.2)
where (F.2) is used to ensure (24) of Lemma 3 below.
Let y denote gross output and m the total resource stock. The production
possibilities are described by the stationary transformation set T given by
T = {[(k,m), (y,m′)] | 0 ≤ y ≤ F (k, r); 0 ≤ r = m−m′ ≤ m} .
A program (ty, tm, tk) is (yt,mt)–feasible if there exist tk, t+1y and t+1m satisfying
0 ≤ kτ ≤ yτ and [(kτ ,mτ ), (yτ+1,mτ+1)] ∈ T for all τ ≥ t ,
The consumption tx associated with a (yt,mt)–feasible program (ty, tm, tk) is de-
fined by xτ = yτ − kτ for all τ ≥ t. A (yt,mt)–feasible program (ty, tm, tk) is
called egalitarian if the consumption stream tx associated with it is egalitarian.
A (yt,mt)–feasible program (ty¯, tm¯, tk¯) is (yt,mt)-efficient if there is no (yt,mt)–
feasible program (ty, tm, tk) satisfying xτ ≥ x¯τ for all τ ≥ t, with strict inequality
for some τ ≥ t.
The set X ⊂ RZ++ of feasible consumption streams, introduced in Section 3, can
be described for DHS technologies by:
X = {0x ∈ RZ++ | 0x is a consumption stream associated
with a (y0,m0)–feasible program (0y, 0m, 0k)} .
Lemma 2 below has the role in the analysis of this section as Lemma 1 had in
the analysis of Section 4. Its proof is similar to that of Lemma 1 as indicated in
Appendix A.5.
Lemma 2 Let (y0,m0) 0 be given. For all δ ∈ (0, 1), X ⊆ Xδ.
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Assumptions (G.1)–(G.4) and (F.1)–(F.2) do not ensure the existence of an egal-
itarian stream with positive consumption. We concentrate on those technologies
satisfying (G.1)–(G.4) and (F.1)–(F.2) which do. That is, we assume:
There exists from any (y,m) 0
an egalitarian positive consumption stream.
(E)
Cass and Mitra (1991) give a necessary and sufficient condition on F for (E) to hold.
Lemma 3 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and (E).
For any (y0,m0) 0, there exists a unique (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me, 0ke)
such that the associated (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0xe  0 is efficient and egalitarian.
Furthermore, the price sequence 0p 0 determined by
p0 = 1 and pt+1Fk(ket ,m
e
t −met+1) = pt for all t ≥ 0 (23)
satisfies:
0 <
pt
pt−1
<
pt+1
pt
for all t > 1 (24)
and:
∞ >
∑∞
t=0
ptx
e
t ≥
∑∞
t=0
ptxt (25)
holds for every (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0x.
For each (y0,m0) 0, consider the unique (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me,
0ke), guaranteed by Lemma 3, such that the associated (y0,m0)-feasible consump-
tion stream 0xe  0 is efficient and egalitarian. Furthermore, let 0p  0 be the
associated price sequence determined by (23). By (25), we have
∑∞
t=0pt < ∞. For
each (y0,m0) 0, we can then define:
δ0(y0,m0) :=
(
p1
p0
)
and δ∞(y0,m0) :=
[∑∞
t=1 pt∑∞
t=0 pt
]
.
For each (y0,m0)  0, we refer to δ0(y0,m0) as the short-run discount factor and
to δ∞(y0,m0) as the long-run discount factor at time 0 supporting the efficient and
egalitarian (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me, 0ke).
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When the short-run discount factor is at least as large as δ, the efficient egali-
tarian program described in Lemma 3 is the unique SDU optimum, as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 5 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and
(E). If (y0, m0)  0 satisfies δ0(y0,m0) ≥ δ, then the efficient and egalitarian
(y0,m0)-feasible stream 0xe  0 is the unique SDU optimum.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3 that 0p 0, the price sequence determined by
(23) and supporting the unique (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me, 0ke), satisfies
(2) and (3). Hence, by Proposition 3, 0xe is the unique SDU optimum.
When the short-run discount factor is smaller than δ, the description of an SDU
optimum is more involved. To carry out the analysis, we have to compare the long-
run discount factor with δ. For this purpose, a preliminary result comparing the
short-run and the long-run discount factors is useful.
Lemma 4 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and (E).
For all (y0,m0) 0, δ0(y0,m0) < δ∞(y0,m0).
To proceed further, we note that even when the short-run discount factor is
initially smaller than δ for a (y0,m0)–feasible program, the short-run discount factor
becomes at least as large as δ after a finite time period, provided the consumption
stream on such a program is bounded away from zero.
Lemma 5 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and (E).
Let (y0,m0) 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1). If a (y0,m0)–feasible program (0y, 0m, 0k) has an
associated (y0,m0)-feasible stream 0x 0 with lim infT→∞w(Tx) > U(0), then there
exists τ ≥ 0 such that δ ≤ δ0(yτ ,mτ ).
As shown in the example illustrating Proposition 4, streams that are not non-
decreasing can be SDU optimum in non-stationary technologies. However, SDU
optimum streams in DHS technologies (as in stationary Ramsey technologies) will
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in fact be streams maximizing w(0x) subject to the constraint that xt ≤ xt+1 for all
t ≥ 0. Such streams have been analyzed in discrete time by Asheim (1988) and in
continuous time by Pezzey (1994). This motivates the following lemma.
Lemma 6 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and (E).
For any (y0,m0) 0, there exists a (y0,m0)–feasible program (0y∗, 0m∗, 0k∗) with
the property that the associated (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0x∗  0 maximizes w(0x)
over all (y0,m0)–feasible and non-decreasing consumption streams 0x. Furthermore,
(i) (0y∗, 0m∗, 0k∗) is unique and time-consistent (for all t ≥ 0, tx∗ maximizes
w(tx) over all (y∗t ,m∗t )–feasible and non-decreasing consumption streams tx),
(ii) 0x∗ ∈ Xϕ; in particular, there is a τ ≥ 0 such that x∗0 < · · · < x∗τ−1 < x∗τ =
x∗τ+1 = · · · , where τ > 0 if δ∞(y0,m0) < δ, and τ = 0 if δ∞(y0,m0) ≥ δ.
(iii) There is a µ such that if 0x is an arbitrary (y0,m0)-feasible stream, with 1x
non-decreasing, then
δ · [w(1x)− w(1x∗)] ≤ µ · [U(x∗0)− U(x0)] (26)
where µ = 1 if δ∞(y0,m0) < δ and 0 < µ ≤ 1 if δ∞(y0,m0) ≥ δ, and where
(26) is strict if the associated (y0,m0)–feasible program (0y, 0m, 0k) is distinct
from (0y∗, 0m∗, 0k∗).
Lemma 6 entails that there exist unique policy functions k∗ and m∗ such that,
for all (y0,m0) 0, k∗0 = k∗(y0,m0), m∗1 = m∗(y0,m0) and y∗1 = F (k∗(y0,m0),m0−
m∗(y0,m0)), where (0y∗, 0m∗, 0k∗) is the unique (y0,m0)–feasible program with the
property that the associated (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0x∗  0 maximizes w(0x) over
all (y0,m0)–feasible and non-decreasing consumption streams 0x.
Theorem 3 Consider a DHS technology satisfying (G.1)–(G.4), (F.1)–(F.2) and
(E). For any δ ∈ (0, 1) and (y0,m0)  0, let 0x∗  0 denote the efficient (y0,m0)-
feasible stream maximizing w(0x) over all (y0,m0)-feasible and non-decreasing con-
sumption streams 0x. Then 0x∗ is the unique SDU optimum. The stream has an
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eventual egalitarian phase, preceded by a phase with increasing consumption if and
only if δ∞(y0,m0) < δ.
Proof. Suppose that 0x is a (y0,m0)–feasible stream distinct from 0x∗ such that
W (0x) ≥ W (0x∗) for some W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4). Let (0y, 0m, 0k)
be the (y0,m0)–feasible program associated with 0x. Since, by Theorem 1(iii) and
Proposition 2(ii) (recalling that 0x∗ is non-decreasing),
W (0x) ≥W (0x) ≥W (0x∗) = w(0x∗) > U(0) ,
it follows from (W) that lim infT→∞w(Tx) > U(0). Hence, by Lemma 5, there exists
τ˜ ≥ 0 such that δ0(yτ˜ ,mτ˜ ) ≥ δ. By Proposition 5 and (W.1), we may assume, with-
out loss of generality, that (τ˜y, τ˜m, τ˜k) = (τ˜ye, τ˜me, τ˜ke), where (τ˜ye, τ˜me, τ˜ke)
is the unique efficient and egalitarian (yτ˜ ,mτ˜ )–feasible program. By Lemmas 4
and 6(i)&(ii), kt = k∗(yt,mt), mt+1 = m∗(yt,mt) and yt+1 = F (k∗(yt,mt),mt −
m∗(yt,mt)) for all t ≥ τ˜ . Since 0x is distinct from 0x∗, we may define τ ≥ 0 by
τ := max{t ≥ 0 | kt 6= k∗(yt,mt) or mt+1 6= m∗(yt,mt)
or yt+1 6= F (k∗(yt,mt),mt −m∗(yt,mt))} .
Let (τy∗, τm∗, τk∗) be the unique (yτ ,mτ )–feasible program with the property
that the associated (yτ ,mτ )–feasible stream τx∗  0 maximizes w(τx′) over all
(yτ ,mτ )–feasible and non-decreasing consumption streams τx′. By the definition of
τ , (τy, τm, τk) is distinct from (τy∗, τm∗, τk∗) with τ+1x being non-decreasing.
By (W.1), we may assume, without loss of generality, that W (τx) ≥ W (τx∗) ≥ 0.
By Lemma 6(iii),
W (τx)−W (τx∗) ≤ w(τx)− w(τx∗) < (1− µ) · [U(xτ )− U(x∗τ )] , (27)
where µ = 1 if δ∞(yτ ,mτ ) < δ and 0 < µ ≤ 1 if δ∞(yτ ,mτ ) ≥ δ, since W (τx) ≤
w(τx) by Proposition 2(i) and W (τx∗) = w(τx∗) by Proposition 2(ii), keeping in
mind that τx∗ ∈ Xϕ is non-decreasing.
Case 1: δ∞(yτ ,mτ ) < δ. Then, by Lemma 6(iii), µ = 1, implying by (27) that,
W (τx)−W (τx∗) < 0. This contradicts W (τx) ≥W (τx∗).
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Case 2: δ∞(yτ ,mτ ) ≥ δ. By Lemma 6(ii), τx∗ is egalitarian, implying that
W (τx∗) = w(τx∗) = w(τ+1x∗). Furthermore, it follows from Proposition 2(i) that
W (τx) ≤W (τ+1x) ≤ w(τ+1x∗). Hence, by Lemma 6(iii),
W (τx)−W (τx∗) ≤ w(τ+1x)− w(τ+1x∗) < µ · [U(x
∗
τ )− U(xτ )]
δ
, (28)
where 0 < µ ≤ 1. If µ = 1, then (27) contradicts W (τx) ≥ W (τx∗). If 0 < µ < 1,
then (27) and (28) are incompatible.
In either case, we contradict that there exists a (y0,m0)–feasible stream 0x dis-
tinct from 0x∗ such that W (0x) ≥W (0x∗) ≥ 0.
It follows from Lemma 6(ii) that 0x∗ has an eventual egalitarian phase, preceded
by a phase with increasing consumption if and only if δ∞(y0,m0) < δ.
6 Concluding remarks
The DHS model of capital accumulation and resource depletion gives rise to inter-
esting distributional conflicts. On the one hand, when applied to DHS technologies
DU undermines the interests of the generations in the far future by forcing con-
sumption to approach zero as time goes to infinity. On the other hand, criteria
like classical utilitarianism and leximin that treat generations equally by satisfying
Finite Anonymity, and thus are not numerically representable, lead to consequences
that may not be compelling: classical utilitarianism leads to unbounded inequality
by giving rise to unlimited growth, while leximin does not allow for any trade-off
between the interests of different generations, meaning that poverty may be perpet-
uated if the economy has a small initial endowment of stocks (cf. Solow, 1974).
In this paper we have applied sustainable discounted utilitarianism (SDU) to
DHS technologies and showed that the application of this criterion resolves in an
appealing way the distributional conflicts that arise in this class of technologies:
(1) It allows for growth and development initially when the economy is highly
productive.
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(2) It leads to an efficient and egalitarian stream eventually when resource deple-
tion and capital accumulation have reduced net capital productivity. By thus
preventing consumption to approach zero, it respects the interests of future
generations. By not yielding unlimited growth, it ensures bounded inequality.
We have also applied SDU to the usual one-sector model of economic growth
(Ramsey technologies). If, in this setting, there is a small initial capital stock (so
that net capital productivity is high), then the criterion leads to the DU optimum
stream with increasing consumption. With a large initial capital stock, however, the
criterion gives rise to an efficient and egalitarian stream.
SDU trades off present and future consumption if and only if the present is
worse off than the future, while it gives priority to the interests of future generations
otherwise. In the two classes of technologies considered, this property of SDU entails
that the criterion allows for economic development when productivity is high without
leading to inequitable outcomes. A dilemma posed by Epstein (1986) (that an
economy has to choose between development and equity; it cannot have both) is
thereby apparently resolved. Moreover, in both classes of technologies, we obtain
intergenerational streams in congruence with a view expressed by Dasgupta and
Heal (1979, p. 311) and Rawls (1999, pp. 251–255) (see also Gaspart and Gosseries,
2007) that trading present consumption for future consumption is more appropriate
for poorer societies, while equality considerations should dominate for richer ones.
The axiomatic underpinning of SDU is not the main focus of this paper, even
though we note (in Proposition 1) that SDU satisfies all the axioms characterizing
sustainable recursive SWFs, a concept analyzed in our companion paper (Asheim,
Mitra and Tungodden, 2009). Rather, the investigation of this paper seeks to demon-
strate convincingly that SDU is an applicable criterion yielding consequences that
might appeal to our ethical intuition.
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A Appendix
A.1 Existence of a Sustainable Discounted Utilitarian SWF
We are given δ ∈ (0, 1) and U : R+ → R satisfying (U.1). We want to establish existence
of a function W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4). To this end, we first establish a basic
monotonicity property, and then use that with a backward iteration device to define a
function W with these properties.
Write Z := [U(0),∞). For (a, b) ∈ Z × Z, define:
f(a, b) = min{(1− δ)a+ δb, b} . (f)
Note that f is a well-defined function from Z2 to Z, and furthermore:
f(a, b) ≤ (1− δ)a+ δb and f(a, b) ≤ b for all (a, b) ∈ Z2 . (A1)
Lemma A.1 Suppose (a, b) ∈ Z2 and (a′, b′) ∈ Z2, with (a′, b′) ≤ (a, b). Then
f(a′, b′) ≤ f(a, b) .
Further, if b′ < b, then
f(a′, b′) < f(a, b) .
Proof. This proof is omitted here, but included in Asheim and Mitra (2008).
Let 0x ∈ Xδ be given. For each T ∈ N, define the finite sequence {z(0, T ), . . . , z(T −
1, T ), z(T, T )} by (1). Notice that this sequence is well-defined since (1−δ)∑∞τ=T δτ−TU(xτ )
∈ Z, keeping in mind that U satisfies (U.1). At each stage of the backward iteration (that
is for t = T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 0) we have z(t, T ) ∈ Z by (f), since U(xt) ∈ Z for all t ≥ 0.
Using Lemma A.1, we can now compare z(0, T ) with z(0, T + 1), for each T ∈ N.
Lemma A.2 For each T ∈ N, we have:
z(t, T ) ≥ z(t, T + 1) for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1} . (A2)
Proof. Given T ∈ N, we have, from (A1) and (1),
z(T, T + 1) ≤ (1− δ)U(xT ) + δ
[
(1− δ)
∑∞
τ=T+1
δτ−T−1U(xτ )
]
= (1− δ)
∑∞
τ=T
δτ−TU(xτ ) = z(T, T ) .
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Thus, applying Lemma A.1, we have:
z(T − 1, T + 1) = f(U(xT−1), z(T, T + 1)) ≤ f(U(xT−1), z(T, T )) = z(T − 1, T ) .
Using Lemma A.1 repeatedly, we then obtain:
z(t, T + 1) ≤ z(t, T ) for all t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}
which establishes (A2).
With these results, we can show that W : Xδ → R defined by (W) is a well-defined SDU
SWF, thereby establishing existence.
Proof of Theorem 1(i). By Lemma A.2, we have {z(0, T )} monotonically non-
increasing in T ∈ N, and it is bounded below by U(0), so it converges. Thus, W is well-
defined by (W), and W maps Xδ to Z since z(0, T ) ≤ z(0, 1) for all T ∈ N and z(0, 1) ∈ Z.
By Lemma A.2, we have {z(t, T )} monotonically non-increasing in T > t, and it is
bounded below by U(0), so it also converges. An implication of (W) is that
W (tx) = limT→∞z(t, T ) (A3)
for all t ∈ N.
To establish (W.1), let 0x ∈ Xδ. We split up the analysis into three cases: (i) U(x0) >
W (1x); (ii) U(x0) < W (1x); (iii) U(x0) =W (1x).
In case (i), using (A3), there is some N ∈ N, such that for all T ≥ N ,
U(x0) > z(1, T )
Thus, by (f) and (1), we have z(0, T ) = z(1, T ) for all T ≥ N . Using (W) and (A3), we
obtain W (0x) =W (1x), as required in (W.1).
In case (ii), using (A3), there is some N ∈ N, such that for all T ≥ N,
U(x0) < z(1, T )
Thus, by (f) and (1), we have z(0, T ) = (1 − δ)U(x0) + δz(1, T ) for all T ≥ N . Using (W)
and (A3), we obtain W (0x) = (1− δ)U(x0) + δW (1x), as required in (W.1).
In case (iii), there are two possibilities: (a) there is a subsequence of T for which z(1, T ) =
U(x0); (b) there is N ∈ N, such that for all T ≥ N , we have z(1, T ) 6= U(x0). In case (a),
using (f) and (1), we have z(0, T ) = z(1, T ) for the subsequence of T (for which z(1, T ) =
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U(x0)). Thus, using (W) and (A3), we have W (0x) = W (1x). But, since U(x0) = W (1x)
in case (iii), this yields W (0x) = (1− δ)U(x0) + δW (1x), as required in (W.1).
In case (iii)(b), either (A) there is a subsequence of T for which U(x0) < z(1, T ), or (B)
there is a subsequence of T for which U(x0) > z(1, T ), or both. In case (A), following the
proof of case (ii), we get W (0x) = (1 − δ)U(x0)W (1x), as required in (W.1). In case (B),
following the proof of case (i), we get W (0x) = W (1x). But, since U(x0) = W (1u) in case
(iii), this yields W (0x) = (1− δ)U(x0) + δW (1x), as required in (W.1).
To establish (W.2), let 0x be an egalitarian stream. By (f) and (1), for each T ∈ N, we
have z(t, T ) = U(x0) for t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1}. Thus, (W) implies that W (0x) = U(x0).
To establish (W.3), consider 0x′, 0x′′ ∈ Xδ with 0x′ ≥ 0x′′. We want to show that
W (0x′) ≥ W (0x′′), as required in (W.3). Define in obvious notation, for each T ∈ N, the
finite sequences {z′(0, T ), . . . , z′(T−1, T ), z′(T, T )} and {z′′(0, T ), . . . , z′′(T−1, T ), z′′(T, T )}
as in (1). By Lemma A.1 and (1), for each T ∈ N, we have z′(t, T ) ≥ z′′(t, T ) for t ∈
{0, . . . , T − 1}. Then, by (W), W (0x′) ≥W (0x′′).
To establish (W.4), let 0x ∈ Xδ. We want to show that limT→∞δtW (Tx) = 0, as
required in (W.4). By Lemma A.1 and (1), for each T ′ ∈ N, we have
z(T, T ′) ≤ (1− δ)
∑∞
t=T
δt−TU(xt)
for T ∈ {0, . . . , T ′ − 1}. Hence, by (A3),
W (Tu) = limT ′→∞z(T, T ′) ≤ (1− δ)
∑∞
t=T
δt−TU(xt) (A4)
for T ≥ 0. Since Z is bounded below, there does not exist ε > 0 and a subsequence T
for which δTW (Tx) ≤ −ε. Suppose there exists ε > 0 and a subsequence T for which
δTW (Tx) ≥ ε. By (A4), for all T in the subsequence,
0 < ε ≤ δTW (Tx) ≤ δT (1− δ)
∑∞
t=T
δt−TU(xt) = (1− δ)
∑∞
t=T
δtU(xt) .
This contradicts that limT→∞(1 − δ)
∑∞
t=T δ
tU(xt) = 0 for all 0x ∈ Xδ. Hence, it follows
that limT→∞δtW (0x′) = 0.
A.2 Uniqueness of Sustainable Discounted Utilitarian SWFs
We now study (given δ ∈ (0, 1) and U : R+ → R satisfying (U.1)) the properties of any
function W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4).
We first state a result concerning the limit behavior of W (tx) as t→∞ if the consump-
tion stream 0x is bounded.
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Lemma A.3 If W is an SDU SWF, then, for every 0x ∈ Xϕ,
(i) limt→∞W (tx) exists
(ii) limt→∞W (tx) = lim inft→∞U(xt) .
Proof. Since, as established in Asheim and Mitra (2008, Section A.2), any SDU SWF
satisfies the axioms O, M, IF, RD, HEF and RC, this result follows from Asheim, Mitra
and Tungodden (2009, Proposition 7).
Proof of Theorem 1(ii). Suppose there are two SDU SWFs, call them W and V ,
such thatW (0x) 6= V (0x) for some 0x ∈ Xϕ. Without loss of generality, letW (0x) > V (0x).
If W (1x) ≤ V (1x), then by Lemma A.1:
V (0x) = f(U(x0), V (1x)) ≥ f(U(x0),W (1x)) =W (0x)
where f is defined by (f). This is a contradiction. Thus, we must have W (1x) > V (1x), and
by repeating this step we obtain:
W (tx) > V (tx) for all t ≥ 0 . (A5)
We also know from Lemma A.3 that:
limt→∞W (tx) = limt→∞V (tx) = lim inft→∞U(xt) . (A6)
Thus, defining a sequence {kt} by kt = [W (tx)− V (tx)] for all t ≥ 0, we see from (A5) and
(A6) that kt > 0 for all t ≥ 0, and kt → 0 as t → ∞. It follows that there is some n for
which we must have kn+1 < kn. That is, we have:
0 < [W (n+1x)− V (n+1x)] < [W (nx)− V (nx)] . (A7)
We then consider three possibilities: (i) U(xn) ≥ W (n+1x), (ii) U(xn) ≤ V (n+1x), and
(iii) V (n+1x) < U(xn) < W (n+1x). If (i) holds, then U(xn) > V (n+1x), and so we have by
(W.1):
(i) W (nx) =W (n+1x)
(ii) V (nx) = V (n+1x)
 (A8)
But (A8) clearly contradicts (A7).
If (ii) holds, then U(xn) < W (n+1x), and so we have by (W.1):
(i) W (nx) = (1− δ)U(xn) +W (n+1x)
(ii) V (nx) = (1− δ)U(xn) + V (n+1x)
 (A9)
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But (A9) implies that [W (nx)− V (nx)] = δ[W (n+1x)− V (n+1x)], which again contradicts
(A7).
If (iii) holds, then we have by (W.1):
(i) W (nx) = (1− δ)U(xn) +W (n+1x)
(ii) V (nx) = V (n+1x)
 (A10)
By (A10)(i) and U(xn) < W (n+1x), we get W (nx) < (1 − δ)W (n+1x) + δW (n+1x) =
W (n+1x), and so by (A10)(ii), we get [W (nx)−V (nx)] = [W (nx)−V (n+1x)] < [W (n+1x)−
V (n+1x)], which again contradicts (A7).
Since these are the only possibilities, there do not exist two SDU SWFs, W and V , such
that W (0x) 6= V (0x) for some 0x ∈ Xϕ. The result follows since, by Theorem 1(i), W is an
SDU SWF.
A.3 Non-Uniqueness of Sustainable Discounted Utilitarian SWF
The uniqueness result of Section A.2 does not carry over to unbounded consumption streams.
To show this, we provide another function W : Xδ → R satisfying (W.1)–(W.4). Let 0x ∈
Xϕ be given. For each T ∈ N, define the finite sequence {w˜(0, T ), . . . , w˜(T − 1, T ), w˜(T, T )}
as follows:
w˜(T, T ) = lim inft→∞U(xt)
w˜(T − 1, T ) = f(U(xT−1), w˜(T, T ))
· · ·
w˜(0, T ) = f(U(x0), w˜(1, T ))

We now define W˜ (0x) on Xϕ by
W˜ (0x) := limT→∞w˜(0, T ) . (W˜)
Extend the domain of W˜ to Xδ as follows. If 0x ∈ Xδ\Xϕ has the property that lim inft→∞
U(xt) exists, then the algorithm (W˜) is still applicable. If 0x ∈ Xδ\Xϕ does not have this
property, construct each stream in the sequence {0xn}n∈N as follows:
xnt =
 n if ∀τ ≥ t, xτ ≥ nxt if ∃τ ≥ t s.t. xτ < n ,
and, since 0xn ∈ Xϕ for each n ∈ N, define W˜ (0x) in the following way:
W˜ (0x) := limn→∞W˜ (0xn) .
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It can be shown that W˜ : Xδ → R satisfies (W.1)–(W.4) and is thus an SDU SWF.
Example of non-uniqueness. Let δ = 12 and U(x) = x
a, where 12 < a < 1, implying that
U : R+ → R satisfies (U.1) and (U.2). Consider
0x = (2
0
a , 0, 2
1
a , 0, 2
2
a , 0, 2
3
a , 0, . . . ) ∈ X 1
2
,
leading to the utility stream 0u = (1, 0, 2, 0, 4, 0, 8, 0, . . . ). Then
W˜ (0x) = 0 < 1 = W (0x) .
It turns out, however, that W provides an upper bound for SDU welfare, as stated in
Theorem 1(iii).
Proof of Theorem 1(iii). Let 0x ∈ Xδ. By Proposition 2 and (1), for all T ∈ N,
W (Tx) ≤ w(Tx) = z(T, T ). Furthermore, by (W.1) and (1), for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
W (tx) = f(U(xt),W (t+1x))
w(t, T ) = f(U(xt), z(t+ 1, T )) ,
where f is defined by (f). By using Lemma A.1 repeatedly, we obtain:
W (0x) ≤ z(0, T ) .
Since this holds for any T ∈ N, the results follows from (W).
A.4 An SDU SWF is a Sustainable Recursive SWF
In Asheim and Mitra (2008, Section A.2) we verify that any SDU SWF satisfies the axioms
O,M, IF, RD, HEF and RC: Order, Monotonicity, Independent Future, Restricted Domi-
nance, Hammond Equity for the Future, and Restricted Continuity (where axiom IF implies
Koopmans’ (1960) stationary condition). This entails that any SDU SWF is a sustainable
recursive SWF, as defined by Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden (2009).
Here we only include the verification of axiom RC, which is explained below in the
course of verifying it. To this end, fix δ ∈ (0, 1) and U : R+ → R satisfying (U.1), assume
that the function W : Xδ → R satisfies (W.1)–(W.4) (note, however, that condition (W.4)
is not needed here), and define a social welfare relation (SWR) % by:
For 0x′, 0x′′ ∈ Xδ, 0x′ % 0x′′ if and only ifW (0x′) ≥W (0x′′) .
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Let 0x′, 0x′′ ∈ Xδ with x′t = x for all t ≥ 1. Let 0xn ∈ Xδ for n ∈ N with the property
that 0xn % 0x′′ for all n ∈ N and
lim
n→∞ supt≥0
|xnt − x′t| = 0 . (A11)
We have to show that 0x′ % 0x′′ to verify axiom RC.
We first claim that W (0x′′) ≤ U(x). Suppose, on the contrary, that W (0x′′) > U(x).
Then, denoting W (0x′′) by ξ, we note that ξ ∈ (U(x),∞).
Choose ε′ > 0 such that U(x + ε′) < ξ. Using (A11), we can choose N ∈ N such that
xNt ≤ x′t + ε′ = x+ ε′ for all t ≥ 1. Then, by (W.1)–(W.3) and (A1),
W (0x′′) ≤W (0xN ) ≤W (1xN ) ≤ U(x′t + ε′) < ξ =W (0x′′) ;
a contradiction. This establishes our claim that W (0x′′) ≤ U(x) Thus, we have W (0x′′) ≤
W (1x′) by (W.2).
Next, we claim that W (0x′′) ≤ W (0x′). Suppose, on the contrary that η := [W (0x′′)−
W (0x′)] > 0. Then, by (W.2) and (W.3), we have
U(0) ≤W (0x′) < W (0x′′) ≤ U(x)
so that U(x)− U(0) ≥ η > 0. Using (A11), we can choose N ∈ N so that x¯N := supt≥1xNt
and xN := inft≥1xNt exist and
|U(xN0 )− U(x′0)| < η , U(x¯N ) < U(x) + η , U(xN ) > U(x)− η . (A12)
Note that it follows from (A1) that, whenever (a, b) ∈ Z2 and (a′, b′) ∈ Z2 satisfy
|a′ − a| < η and |b′ − b| < η, we must have
|f(a′, b′)− f(a, b)| < η . (A13)
We now show that:
|W (0xN )−W (0x′)| < η . (A14)
Note that by (A12), W (1xN ) ≤ U(x¯N ) < U(x) + η = W (1x′) + η, using (W.2) and (W.3).
Similarly, W (1xN ) ≥ U(xN ) > U(x)− η =W (1x′)− η. Thus,
|W (1xN )−W (1x′)| < η . (A15)
We have W (0xN ) = f(xN0 ,W (1x
N )) and W (0x′) = f(x′0,W (1x
′)). Thus, using (A12),
(A13) and (A15), we obtain (A14).
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In particular, (A14) implies that:
W (0x′) + η =W (0x′′) ≤W (0xN ) < W (0x′) + η ;
a contradiction. This establishes the claim that W (0x′) ≥W (0x′′) and so 0x′ % 0x′′.
The same kind of argument can be used to show 0x′ - 0x′′ if 0xn - 0x′′ for all n ∈ N.
A.5 Proofs of Lemmas 1–6
Proof of Lemma 1. Let y0 > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) be given, implying that (1 + δ)/2δ > 1.
While f(k)/k > 1 for all k > 0, we have limk→∞[f(k)/k] = 1. Thus, there is K > y0
such that f(k)/k ≤ (1 + δ)/2δ for all k ≥ K. This implies that, for all k ≥ K, we have
δf(k)/k ≤ (1 + δ)/2 ≡ µ < 1.
Define k0 = K, and kt+1 = f(kt) for t ≥ 0, at = f(kt)/kt for t ≥ 0, and pit =
∏t
s=0 as
for t ≥ 0. Then, for every y0-feasible stream, we have xt+1 ≤ yt+1 ≤ f(yt − xt) ≤ f(yt) ≤
f(kt) = a(t)k(t) = pi(t)K, and so:
δt+1xt+1 ≤ δt+1pitK ≤ µt+1K for all t ≥ 0 .
Hence, for every y0-feasible stream,
∑∞
t=0 δ
txt ≤ K/(1− µ) <∞.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let (y0,m0) >> 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1) be given. Define f(k) =
F (k,m0, 1)+k for k ≥ 0. Then f(k)/k > 1 for all k > 0, while we have limk→∞[f(k)/k] = 1.
Therefore, the argument given in the proof of Lemma 1 applies here as well.
Proof of Lemma 3. The existence of an efficient and egalitarian (y0,m0)–feasible
program (0ye, 0me, 0ke), such that the associated (y0,m0)–feasible consumption stream 0xe
 0, follows from Dasgupta and Mitra (1983, Proposition 5); uniqueness follows from (F.1).
Property (24) of the price sequence 0p follows from Asheim (1988, Lemma 3 and Proposition
1). Property (25) of maximization of the present value of the consumption stream at 0xe
follows from Dasgupta and Mitra (1983, Theorem 1).
Proof of Lemma 4. The price sequence 0p 0, determined by (23), and supporting
the unique (y0,m0)–feasible program (0ye, 0me, 0ke) obtained in Lemma 3, satisfies (24).
Denote (p1/p0) by ρ. Then, by using (24), we have θ > 0, such that (pt+1/pt) > ρ + θ for
all t ≥ 1. Let T ≥ 2 be given. Then, for t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, we have
pt+1 > ρpt + θpt . (A16)
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Adding up the inequalities in (A16) from t = 1 to t = T, we get:
p2 + p3 + · · ·+ pT+1 > ρ(p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pT ) + θp1 . (A17)
Adding the trivial equality p1 = ρp0 to (A17), we obtain:
p1 + p2 + p3 + · · ·+ pT+1 > ρ(p0 + p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pT ) + θp1 .
This yields[
p1 + p2 + p3 + · · ·+ pT+1
p0 + p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pT
]
> ρ+
[
θp1
p0 + p1 + p2 + · · ·+ pT
]
≥ ρ+
[
θp1
σ
]
, (A18)
where σ =
∑∞
t=0 pt. Letting T →∞ in (A18), we get:
δ∞(y0,m0) ≥ ρ+
[
θp1
σ
]
> ρ = δ0(y0,m0) ,
which is the desired result.
Proof of Lemma 5. Assume that (0y, 0m, 0k) is a (y0,m0)–feasible program where
the associated (y0,m0)-feasible stream 0x 0 satisfies lim infT→∞w(Tx) > U(0). By (G.1)
and (G.3), there exists k˜ ≥ 1 satisfying F (1,m0/k˜) ≤ 1/δ. Note that kT → ∞ as T → ∞
and mt > 0 for all t ≥ 0 (since otherwise lim infT→∞ w(Tx) = U(0), contradicting the
hypothesis of the lemma). Choose a time τ such that kτ ≥ k˜ ≥ 1. Consider the efficient
and egalitarian (yτ ,mτ )–feasible program (τye, τme, τke), with supporting price sequence
τp. By Lemma 3 and (G.1)–(G.3),[
1
δ0(yτ ,mτ )
]
=
[
pτ
pτ+1
]
= Fk(kτ ,mτ −meτ+1) ≤ F (kτ ,mτ −meτ+1)/kτ
≤ F (1, (mτ −meτ+1)/kτ ) < F (1,m0/k˜) ≤
1
δ
,
thereby establishing that there is a finite time τ such that δ0(yτ ,mτ ) ≥ δ.
Proof of Lemma 6. Existence follows from Asheim (1988, Proposition 2, sufficiency
part). Parts (i) and (ii) follow from Asheim (1988, Lemma 4 (a) and (c)). That 0x∗ is
egalitarian if δ∞(y0,m0) ≥ δ follows from Asheim (1988, Lemma 4 (b)). The proof of
Asheim (1988, Lemma 4) implies the two-phase structure of 0x∗, stated in part (ii). Finally,
Lemma 5 of this paper establishes that τ of part (ii) is finite.
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